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 Abstract 
 
 
 
 The purpose of this study is to examine how well the countries in the Western 
Hemisphere translate Organization of American States’ (OAS) resolutions into actual 
meaningful legislation, and how international discourse influences, or does not, domestic 
policy. This study will utilize the data program QDA Miner in order to better analyze 
texts of agreements and treaties put forth by the OAS, and to highlight the correlation 
between different types of rhetoric and meaningful member state action. Data will be 
gathered primarily from the OAS’ own data bases and compiled into the QDA software 
for analysis. This analysis will allow the agreements to be divided into “rhetoric 
categories.” 
 After the agreements are analyzed and divided up into their respective rhetoric 
categories, regression will be run using SPSS 19.1 IBM software. This software will 
allow for the interpretation of whether or not there is a correlation between competing 
types of international discourse and the domestic policies of member states. 
 Prior to this study, many different research studies have been carried out to 
examine what compels different countries act in accordance with International 
Organizations and what does not. Compliance with international declarations and 
agreements has long since been a question and focal point of study when analyzing 
international institutions and this study aims to understand what role, if any, language and 
rhetoric plays in the issue of compliance.  
 
 
From Force to Forceful Language: A Review of the Literature 
 
 The question of compliance has long since been a puzzle for scholars of 
international relations and international organizations. International institutions are 
structures that aim to unify and organize a group, or groups of countries
1
. These 
institutions are formed on a voluntary basis, and this is where the trouble the starts
2
. If an 
institution is comprised of voluntary members, then how can a resolution-writing 
assembly, even a centralized one, get member nations to comply with declarations and 
agreements? There are two major competing theories that seek to explain compliance 
with international declarations and agreements: 1) the collective goods theory; and, 2) the 
fear of being the outsider theory. This portion of the study will aim to examine them and 
offer another possible explanatory theory, namely the rhetorical approach.  
From a structural standpoint, money makes the institution. An institution can 
expect no action if it does not have a budget. If an institution is created on voluntary 
membership, then its budget, too, must be created on voluntary payments. While 
payments may be optional and non-desirable for member states, the reception of 
collective goods and benefits from the institution is desirable
3
.  
                                                 
1
 Bennett, p 34 
2
 Bennett, p. 41. According to Bennett, the voluntary aspect of international organizations 
represents both a positive and a negative aspect. On the positive side, the voluntary nature 
of the international organizations allows member states to join freely and not feel as 
though they are giving up sovereignty to do so. On the negative side, since they are 
voluntary, action is sometimes limited and the organizations must be tread lightly when 
making decisions, as it could result in a loss of members.  
3
 Larsen-Freeman, p. 48. In a perfect scenario for any member country, payment would 
not be necessary. If a country chooses not to pay, however, the overall budget of the 
organization goes down – and the collective goods within the organization, too, plummet. 
One of the most alluring features of any group, from the local, regional, national 
levels to the international levels, are the collective goods that the group can provide. One 
way that any institution seeks to attract membership is to show potential members that the 
overall good of the group would be greater, if each individual member provided to the 
group as a whole. 
4
 Any member that joins the group, so long as they follow the rules of 
the group and participate in the group’ affairs, can benefit from the group’s collective 
goods
5
. In order to gain anything from a group, one must put in to the group – a simple 
give and take, but you cannot have one without the other.  
This theory is relatively simple in its logic: if a country becomes a member of an 
institution and follows the bylaws of that institution, that country seeks to gain all the 
benefits that the institution has to offer
6
. This simple logic has been analyzed and used to 
explain member state’s compliance with institutional declarations and agreements for 
decades. It relies on “rational behavior” and the idea of “collective conceptualization” 
from all member states. 
7
Member states, if they are rational actors, would join these 
institutions in order to receive countless benefits and collective goods ranging from but 
                                                 
4
 Gowa, p.12. The collective goods of any organization naturally augment if more 
members that are willing to contribute join. 
5
 Gowa, p.13. This is an important point that ties back to Bennett’s discussion of 
voluntary. As Bennett pointed out, membership (and all that comes along with 
membership, e.g. following the rules) is voluntary. Gowa points out, however, that the 
only way a member state will benefit from the collective good is if that member state 
abides by the rules of the organization. If a member state, for example, joined an 
organization, but did not contribute and did not ever follow the rules of that organization, 
that member state could not expect to benefit from the collective goods. 
6
 It must be noted that this logic is based off the assumption that other member states will 
also abide by the same set of rules, following the same logic.  
7
 Riggins, p.xxii 
not limited to, “collective security, increased technological advancements & trade 
markets.”8  
Based on this theory, there can be power in numbers.  Assuming that participating 
member states actually aim to positively contribute to the group, then it is better to work 
in conjunction with other member states than to rely solely on the brainpower, manpower 
and economic power of your own member state. “Higher levels of performance” can only 
emerge from “cooperation and constant partnership” between member states9.  For 
example, the United States, based on this theory, would be better off joining an institution 
that offered discounts on oil, since it does not have enough oil to sustain itself
10
. Many 
small and recently formed European states find themselves joining Western European 
alliance coalitions to “offset and reduce costs of telecommunications, a good which is 
needed but difficult for new nations to produce.”11 And the same can be seen in Latin 
America, with many smaller nations joining the Organization of American States to 
                                                 
8
 Weymann, chp. 6. Collective goods can be small or large, they can be simple or 
complicated; each collective good is unique. In order to get any of the collective goods, 
large or small, a member state must first act in accordance with the organization. To do 
so requires, as Weymann points out, rational action. 
9
 Lee, p.2. As member states begin to interact with each other, whether that be multi-
laterally or bi-laterally, greater productivity can be the result. Cooperation is often a way 
to increase output. 
10
 Kapur, 1995. It makes sense logically for a country to go outside of its borders to get a 
good or service that it does not have on its own.  
11
 Sandholtz, p.91. It can be seen from this example that some goods, while desirable, are 
difficult for small and developing nations to attain. In these cases, it is smartest for 
smaller countries to join international organizations and agreements to get the goods that 
they cannot get on their own. 
partake in treaties and security alliances to protect themselves from the “threat of piracy 
and intervention.”12  
All across the globe, collective goods serve to be a major reason why countries 
join institutions and organizations. But it is not enough to merely join the organization. In 
order to receive the benefits, a member country must follow the bylaws and declarations 
of the organization.  
The collective goods and benefits theory casts a rationalist light on international 
politics and makes the assumption that all members are rational and self-serving. Based 
on this theory, it would be unlikely that a member country would follow a declaration or 
agreement without the promise of some collective good.  
Another competing theory is centered on the “fear of being the outsider.”13 Rather 
than complying with agreements and declarations to receive collective goods, this school 
of thought suggests that member countries comply with agreements and declarations to 
avoid being perceived as the outsider or rebel within an organization.
14
 In other words, 
member states comply to uphold the organizational norms. 
International institutions have an “innate and general propensity” for states “to 
comply with international treatises, declarations and agreements.”15 The analogy is like a 
                                                 
12
 Foran, p.147. Foran suggests that smaller and lesser developed countries often coalesce 
because the power that they can amass in a group is much greater than the power they 
could produce unilaterally. 
13
 Haas, 1997 
14
 Haas, 1997. Transparency is a major tool that international organizations use to get 
countries to comply with treaties and agreements. Within the structures of many 
international organizations, the actions of all member states are visible. If, for example, 
one member country is blatantly ignoring a declaration, all member countries have easy 
access to this information. If a country is constantly seen as disregarding agreements and 
declarations, this country becomes vulnerable within the group. 
15
 Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, p.84 
game with a set of players. Each player must follow the rules, and negligence is 
transparent. For this reason, if a member country (or player) does not follow a declaration 
or agreement (or breaks the rules), all other member countries will see and therefore 
judge the delinquent member country,
16
 or worse, impose isolation or excess trade costs 
on the delinquent member country. 
Member countries feel a pressure to conform and comply with international 
institution’s agreements and declarations simply to avoid the chastisement of other 
member states. J Harrop, author of Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International 
Organizations, compares the situation to being bullied in the schoolyard. The 
international institution is the bully, so to speak, and the member countries are fellow 
classmates who comply to avoid the wrath of the older bully. And true to the playground 
analogy, other member countries (or classmates), often team up with the bully, even if 
they do not really believe in what the bully is doing or saying, leaving those who openly 
go against the grain susceptible to being socially ostracized from the group.
17
 
Both schools of thought are logically sound and straightforward. Both offer 
insight into the pivotal question of why states act in accordance with an international 
institution’s declarations and agreements, yet neither can fully explain the phenomena. A 
third school of thought, which has yet to be fully assessed, is the rhetorical approach and 
the power of language. Language is defined as any means of communication, verbal or 
written, that allows two or more people or groups of people to interact with one and 
                                                 
16
 Fang, p.13. This compliments Haas’ theory of transparency and the fear of being the 
outsider. 
17
 Harrop, pp.152-159.  
other
18
. Language is what allows the declarations and agreements to be communicated, 
and without language these documents would not be created. Even with this knowledge, 
however, many are quick to overlook the careful language that is put into each agreement 
and declaration.  
It is no mistake that diplomats and legislative bodies spend countless hours and 
efforts to choose each word in every agreement and declaration put forth. The reason for 
this is as clear as the logic in the aforementioned schools of thought. Language has power 
and influence to frame issues and debates, to shift the nuanced connotations of words, 
and to reflect the strength of societal and regional norms. If something is worded to 
strongly, it could be mistaken as offensive
19
. Conversely, if something is worded to 
ambiguously or weakly, it could be ignored and not taken seriously
20
. There is a fine line 
between aggressive and passive language, and when it comes to compliance, the line 
must be respected.  
The psychological power of language can be just as important as the political 
environment of any given institution
21
. The two most important facets of good diplomatic 
language that will produce compliance are clarity and tone.  
Any document, which seeks to gain compliance, must obviously be clear. If a 
piece is not clear, and member states do not understand what is being asked of them, the 
                                                 
18
 Conley, p.17 
19
 Thornborrow, p. 32 
20
 Thornborrow, p.34 
21
 Kitzinger, p. 38. Kitzinger argues that language has a truly dynamic power. It has the 
power to shift and mold beliefs. Language can both inspire people and turn people away 
from any particular cause. A positive outcome could seem negative with the proper 
wording, and the converse can also be true. Language really does have the power to call 
for action. 
hope that they will comply is zero. It can be assumed, for the purpose of this paper, that 
any document that has become an official declaration or agreement is clear.  
Tone is perhaps the most important part of any written or verbal declaration. 
Aggressive language that is too harsh will immediately produce feelings of hostility
22
. 
Aggressive language can be defined as language with but not limited to “profanity, direct 
threats, excessive mandates, condescending wording, excessive informal pronoun usage, 
and extremely rigid and unattainable time frames.
23” Aggressive language, though 
unhelpful when it comes to international diplomacy, is often used by authority figures 
that feel strongly about accomplishing a certain goal, or feel strongly that one member 
needs to somehow be reprimanded.
24
 The thought behind this tactic is logical – an angry 
tone will send a serious and powerful message. Powerful language asserts power, right?  
In the case of international institutions and achieving solidarity and collective 
action amongst member states, there is a “certain paradox” that collective action “poses 
for individual member states and central bodies of power.”25 In many cases, an authority 
figure is advised to use aggressive language. Think for example, to the captain of a sports 
team. When his or her team is playing poorly, or he needs to rally them up for a big 
game, aggressive language is most always used. It has a way of inciting players to act. 
                                                 
22
 Kitzinger, p. 51. This is true across all levels of the spectrum from personal interaction 
to international level interaction. A message that is worded aggressively has an innate 
ability to deter the listener (whether that be a person, or a country). 
23
 Giles, 1987 
24
 Giles, 1987. This can be analogous to a parent and a child. Often times when a child 
misbehaves a parent feels it necessary to scold the child. Although this can sometimes 
have the reverse effect, the parent often believes that scolding the child will mold that 
child into behaving a certain way. 
25
 Donnellon, p. 19 
The dynamic in an international institution, however, is vastly different.
26
 There is, as 
Donnellon suggests, less of a need to be incited (or fired up so to speak), and more of a 
need to be coaxed into acting.
27
  
Persuasive language, therefore, is the best way to get member states to act in 
accordance with agreements and declarations. Persuasive language is language that 
“poses a solution rather than just focusing on a problem” and “asserts that this solution is 
the best solution.”28 Persuasive language by no means poses a threat to any member state, 
but rather highlights the importance of action
29
. Persuasive language sets out to create a 
“collective and solidified identity” amongst member states and subtly puts pressure on 
each member state to act - without each member state’s cooperation, the goal has no way 
of being accomplished.  
As opposed to aggressive language, persuasive language often carries more of an 
encouraging connotation. It aims to encourage member states to act, rather than forcing 
them to do so. A gentle prod, rather than a forceful shove.  
Although none would deny the importance of language in the creation of 
agreements and declarations, detailed research into the effects of language on compliance 
                                                 
26
 Because it is cooperative collective action where the benefit is derived through 
cooperating with other sides, whereas the sports team derives benefits through collective 
action to defeat the other team.  In other words, there is an in group and out group that 
requires them to cooperate with each other in order to compete with/ destroy the other 
group (similar to a military organization, but different from an institution where there is 
no other to destroy (or doing so would actually deprive them of the benefits of the 
organization). 
27
 Donnellon, p.25. International organizations and member states are different from 
sports teams and players because of diplomacy. Sports teams are very aggressive and 
competitive, and while international organizations and member states can also have those 
qualities, the latter is done so in a politically correct and proper arena. 
28
 Kitzinger, p.71 
29
 Kitzinger, p. 73. This type of language offers incentives and emphasizes the positive 
results of acting, rather than threatening the negative results of disobeying. 
and cooperation has yet to be carried out in full. This study aims to examine whether or 
not language plays a role in getting member states to act on the agreements and 
declarations that they have signed on to within international institutions that they have 
joined – specifically the Organization of American States (OAS).  
 
Contributions of This Research 
 
 This research seeks to understand the relationship, if any, between the careful use 
of language within treaties and agreements put forth by international organizations, and 
the impact that it has on domestic policy making by member states to implement these 
agreements. For many years research has been carried out to show the effects of 
collective goods and a desire to obtain a group mentality. Previous research has shown 
that these theories do have an effect on a member state’s policy-making choices. 
Research on language and the power of linguistic choices, however, has not yet been 
carried out. 
 For this reason, this paper will offer an alternative approach: the power of 
language.  
 
Hypothesis 
 
H1: The more aggressive the language is in an OAS declaration or agreement; the 
less likely countries will be to act in accordance with the declaration or agreement. 
*The converse of this hypothesis would state: The more persuasive the 
language is in an OAS declaration or agreement; the more likely countries 
will be to act in accordance with the declaration or agreement. 
 
 The central hypothesis aims to examine the effect that different types of rhetoric 
have on member state action within the context of the Organization of American States. 
A criticism of many international organizations is that agreements and declarations 
offered by the organizations are seldom put into practice
30
.  
 Within the Organization of American States consensus is required for resolutions 
to be passed and put into effect. Declarations and agreements within the Organization of 
American States, however, are unique in that they do not require consensus. For this 
reason, declarations and agreements were selected as a helpful unit of analysis, since they 
offer the most variance in terms of signatories and member-state action.  
 The effects of language have been studied for quite some time, yet quantative 
analysis on the effects of language on decision and policy making is marginal. For this 
reason the hypothesis was selected to serve as a means of studying the effects that the 
language within declarations and agreements, has on producing meaningful member-state 
action. 
 
 Methodology 
                                                 
30
 Coicaud, Jean- Marc, p. 2. Discusses the “legitimacy deficit” and explains the major 
challenge with International Organizations, since their foundations (the majority of which 
were founded 50 years ago), to be getting state governments to act in accordance with the 
wishes of the people and the international organizations. In other words, according with 
Coicaud, the major challenge is getting states not to act autonomously. 
  This paper will utilize QDA Miner 19.1, word-analyzing software. The software 
has the capability of analyzing the impact of certain words and/or phrase throughout a 
database of speeches, pieces of legislation, or any word-document. For this reason, all of 
the documents uploaded into the software had to be compiled manually – leaving some 
room for subjectivity.  
 This study will use declarations and agreements put forth by the OAS over three 
decades. Each declaration and agreement once uploaded into the QDA Miner 19.1 
software will then be analyzed to examine how “aggressive” the text is. Aggressiveness 
of a text will be determined by assessing the number of aggressive words that exist within 
the declaration or agreement (this assessment will be traced using the QDA Miner 19.1 
Software). Target words of aggression, which were selected based on Chapter 16, entitled 
“Signaling and Perception,” written by Richard Jervis (Columbia University), within the 
book Political Psychology, by Kristen R. Monroe. The following words were targeted 
within the QDA Miner 19.1 Software and traced throughout the declarations and 
agreements being analyzed: ‘mandates,’ ‘requires,’ ‘condemns,’ ‘detests,’ ‘dictates,’ 
‘orders,’ and ‘censures.’ The number of times these target words appear within each 
declaration or agreement will be recorded and put into an SPSS database. This 
information will serve as the independent variable for this study. 
 Once compiled, the results of each declaration or agreement will be analyzed for 
each member country. Two factors for analysis will be used, utilizing SPSS software: 1) 
what percent of member countries signed onto the agreement or declaration? A 
percentage was required to ensure that the analysis was at the interval/ratio level of 
analysis, which is necessary in order to run regression analysis and to obtain the Pearson 
R Correlation value. A percentage was obtained by manually dividing the number of 
cosignatories by the total number of member states (35) within the Organization of 
American States. The information available for this variable was obtained from the OAS 
Archives on agreements and declarations. 2) What was the total number of specific 
legislative or policy-related action carried out with the purpose of supporting the 
declaration or agreement? This data was obtained from within the OAS website, as well 
as the government websites of various member countries. The data compiled for these 
two variables were then entered into the same SPSS database as the “target words” data. 
The conjunction of these two factors will serve as the dependent variable for this study.  
 Two factors will be used because merely signing on to an agreement or 
declaration is not enough and does not ensure that a country actually intends to follow 
through with what it has signed on to. Historically, it is not uncommon for a country to 
sign on to a declaration and then do nothing more. It is necessary, but not sufficient to 
prove that a member country is acting in accordance with the declaration or agreement. 
 All data for this study was collected manually and the references for the data 
portion of this study are highlighted in bold face font in the references section.  
 
Data and Findings: 
 Since all three variables were obtained at the interval/ratio level of analysis, 
regression analysis could be run on the dataset. The data set is comprised of twenty 
different agreements and declarations from over forty years. The actions of all thirty-five 
member-countries were included for each of the twenty agreements and declarations. The 
following data was produced when regression analysis was run: 
 
Dependent Variable 1: Percent of Signatories: 
 
Correlations 
 
@_of_CoSignat
ories 
Type_of_Langu
age 
Pearson Correlation @_of_CoSignatories 1.000 .785 
Type_of_Language .785 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) @_of_CoSignatories . .000 
Type_of_Language .000 . 
N @_of_CoSignatories 20 20 
Type_of_Language 20 20 
 
 
 The above graphics provide the data that was gathered from the regression 
analysis. The analysis shows a positive correlation at the 0.001 level of significance, 
meaning that there is a strong and highly significant relationship between the independent 
and dependent variable in question. It is also important to note that the dataset is 
complete and there are no missing pieces of data, as shown by the “Correlation Graphic,” 
under the N section which shows “20” for all cells.  
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .785
a
 .616 .594 22.06340 .616 28.815 1 18 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Type_of_Language 
 
From the correlation analysis it is clear that there is a strong, positive relationship 
between the type of language used and the percentage of signatories for each declaration 
and agreement being analyzed.  
The model summary, however, shows the most significant findings. The Adjusted 
R Square produced a value of 0.594, meaning that 59.4% of the variance of why member 
states sign onto agreements or declarations can be explained based on the type of 
language. 
Although this does not explain 100% of the variance, 59.4% is a rather-large 
portion, meaning that the empirical data strongly supports the hypothesized relationship. 
 
 
Dependent Variable 2: Number of Member State Actions: 
 
 
Correlations 
 
@#_of_Member
_Actions 
Type_of_Langu
age 
Pearson Correlation @#_of_Member_Actions 1.000 .526 
Type_of_Language .526 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) @#_of_Member_Actions . .009 
Type_of_Language .009 . 
N @#_of_Member_Actions 20 20 
Type_of_Language 20 20 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .526
a
 .276 .236 8.49493 .276 6.873 1 18 .017 
  
 
The above graphics provide the data that was gathered from the regression 
analysis. The analysis shows a positive correlation at the 0.05 level of significance, 
meaning that there is a significant relationship between the independent and dependent 
variable in question. It is also important to note that the dataset is complete and there are 
no missing pieces of data, as shown by the “Correlation Graphic,” under the N section 
which shows “20” for all cells. 
From the correlation analysis it is clear that there is a positive relationship 
between the type of language used in the declarations being analyzed and the number of 
concrete actions taken by member states to implement the declarations. Although the 
correlation is not as strong as the correlation between the type of language and the 
percent of signatories, there is still a significant and positive correlation nonetheless. 
The model summary, however, shows the most significant findings. The Adjusted 
R Square produced a value of 0.236, meaning that 23.6% of the variance of why member 
states sign onto agreements or declarations can be explained based on the type of 
language. 
Although this does not explain 100% of the variance, 23.6% is a substantial 
portion, meaning that the hypothesized relationship is again supported. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions: 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Type_of_Language 
 
Both of the relationships analyzed produced significant results in terms of 
explaining why member states sign and act to implement agreements and declarations put 
forth by the Organization of American States. 
The research shows that one reason why member states sign onto agreements or 
the type of language could explain declarations that an agreement or declaration contains. 
Other factors, such as voting blocs, regional alliances, or domestic policies also play a 
factor, but this study has provided information and data showing that language and 
rhetoric also plays a sizeable role in getting member states to sign onto agreements and 
declarations at the very least. 
 For this reason alone this research is invaluable. Member states and international 
organization agreement-writing personnel should carefully consider the findings of this 
research. It is evident, based on this research that rhetoric certainly has an effect on 
member countries signing onto agreements and declarations, and therefore should be 
considered carefully. Literature suggests that aggressive language is often sought out in 
order to bring precedence to certain issues and to highlight importance. This research, 
however, should serve as a precautionary tool for any member state or organization 
wishing to pursue this avenue in hopes of getting member-state concordance. 
It must be noted, however, that the type of language explained the percentage of 
signatories dependent variable more than it explained the concrete actions taken variable. 
There are two possible explanations for this finding. First, that member states rarely carry 
out domestic policies pertaining to agreements and declarations, leaving little room for 
language to play an important factor in determining when to act and when not to act. 
Second, that there are external factors compelling member states to act. 
The latter explanation leaves room for further research and examination. There 
are several factors identified in the literature review carried out for this study that could 
be further analyzed, but were not in this particular paper given the fact that they were out 
of the scope of this research. 
The first could be political alliances. Political alliances are present within every 
organization from the local, to state, to national, to international level. Alliances are part 
of politics as coalitions and groups always form. For this reason, research would suggest 
that analyzing the effects of political alliances on getting member states to act would be 
beneficial, and could perhaps produce more significant results. 
The second could be the political atmosphere. Time was accounted into this study 
in terms of elapsed time; it was not, however, analyzed contextually. In other words, 
different time periods produce different political environments. Perhaps a certain decade 
gave way to increased legislative action within the region. On the other hand, a different 
decade could have been more cautionary and/or lethargic in terms of domestic policies. 
For this reason, contextualizing time and adding it into the study could be of critical 
importance for further research.  
The third and final alternative avenue of research could be the economic and 
budgetary environment. This research highlighted the power of the purse as a means of 
solidifying collective goods, but it did not examine the power of the purse as a restrictive 
or permissive factor in domestic politics. Recession, and its counterpart, growth, has 
enormously different effects on domestic policies and government programs. For this 
reason, if each member countries budget and economic standing could be operationalized 
and then assessed, it too could serve as a crucial variable for the research. 
Even without analyzing these three, or additional, variables, the current paper has 
lent significant empirical support to the argument that rhetoric matters in international 
organizations, and in the impact of international agreements on domestic politics. Words 
that are written down, though they can be altered, frame arguments and have lasting 
effects on the policies that are created and the agreements and declarations that are 
supported. Though word choice and rhetorical strength are not exclusively used as 
deciding factors, none can deny the significance of language. 
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